Basics of Input Theory
The premise of Input Theory is quite simple: “Input Occurs”. If this sounds like a kind of idealism, that's because it kind of is. But in its simplest, most elegant form. It does not assume a mind or experiences or an experiencer. Just input. This has the advantage of bypassing most common “plausible scenario” challenges. Whether we live in a simulation, a material world, a theistic world, or whether we are brains in vats or dreams of higher beings, the concept of input is still coherent. This is similar to the Cartesian “I am thinking, therefore I am”, but without assuming “I” or “thinking” or “being”. This gives us some ground to stand on. But unfortunately, we must note that “input” is incredibly unspecific.
Our “input” could be a variety of things. We could be experiencing flashes of light, colors or a stream of smells or numbers. It could be akin to what we imagine a tree or an amoeba has. Or perhaps an animal, like a dog or a zebra. But our input is incredibly diverse. It has colors, smells, tastes, sounds, appearances, intuitions, memories, and expectations. But I am getting ahead of myself. Did you notice it? I just used the word “our,” but it is not a part of the axiom. This is where we must face an uncomfortable truth: input that occurs to me does not include the inputs of others.
Consider this: if I begin to talk about colors, my metaphysical framework will exclude blind people; if I talk about sounds, it will exclude deaf people. If I begin to talk about preferences, it might exclude certain groups of mentally ill people. And almost any input I describe will exclude input that non-human organisms may have, if they exist. If I want to be more epistemologically consistent, I would have to use “I” language exclusively. However, my goal is not epistemological consistency. I believe that other people have input similar to my own. And I want to convey ideas to other people. So, instead, I will use “we” language. I will justify this later, but the important thing to keep in mind is that I am talking about my input specifically, while unjustifiably (or so it may seem) generalizing the claims.
This might seem like a weakness exclusive to input theory, but it is not. The problem of other minds is quite prevalent in philosophy, and whether you are a materialist, a theist, or an idealist, you have to contend with it. I just chose to state this problem explicitly. If you are a materialist, for example, you only have access to your own senses when determining “truth” about the material world. The real weakness of the Input Theory is that this issue is more opaque. But we will see that the “issue” will actually be a solution to about half of the problems that other frameworks face.
For now, we will differentiate between two frameworks: Weak Input Theory (WIT), which is just “input occurs,” and Strong Input Theory (SIT), which is “my input occurs.” This essentially adds many more other claims, like “some of my input is visual” and “I feel like there is a world out there”. Crucially, Strong Input Theory only makes claims about input. It does not, for example, say “there is a world out there”, just that it feels like there is. I hope the reader finds, however, that their input aligns with mine. And if it doesn’t, for example, if they cannot see, then the set of conclusions that will follow from SIT might be different for them. It bears repeating that this is an issue that all metaphysical frameworks must deal with in some way or another.
